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Abstract
Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relates
to concerns for equality and eciency. Subjects perform dictator games and
a guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the self-
regarding type. When performing a comparison within the same degree of ra-
tionality, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other
subjects.
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1Modeling preferences of economic agents is at the center of a long lasting debate about
human behavior. There exists evidence that people respond to motivations that go beyond
the maximization of personal material payos (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ock-
enfels, 2000) and exhibit bounded rationality when taking decisions with economic content
(Selten, 1998). In an experiment we study how dierent distributional preferences relate
to measures of bounded rationality. We employed three player dictator games to elicit con-
cerns for eciency and for equality (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel,
2004; Cox and Sadiraj, 2010) and a guessing game to evaluate their depth of reasoning
(Nagel, 1995; Grosskopf and Nagel, 2008).
Dictator games are simple and not aected by any strategic consideration. They can
discriminate precisely between dierent distributional motives and can help in disentan-
gling types of behavior related to other-regarding preferences. On the other hand, the
guessing game is well-suited to investigate strategic thinking and evaluate the degree of
(bounded) rationality of subjects. According to Ho et al. (1998), in a guessing game "[t]he
presence of a limited number of steps of iterated dominance could be taken as a sharp
measure of the degree of bounded (mutual) rationality." The guessing game is a constant
sum game, thus concerns for eciency do not aect behavior; moreover the equilibrium
strategy is the same for self-regarding and for other-regarding preferences, hence providing
a measure of strategic rationality that is independent from social concerns.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the experimental design, Sec-
tion 2 reports the results. Section 3 concludes.
1 Experimental design
Experiments were run at Purdue University. Overall 195 undergraduate students partici-
pated in 16 sessions. Each subject participated in only one of the sessions.1
At the beginning of each session, we elicited the preferences of all subjects with respect
to concern for equality and eciency in a static context, along the lines of Engelmann and
Strobel (2004). We presented two tables to each subject (Table 1). Each table proposed a
choice between alternative allocations of money among a group of three persons. Person
2 was the dictator in the group. The experiment elicited each participant's choice as if
she was the dictator. In order to have more observations, we asked all subjects to choose,
before knowing if their decision mattered or not. At the end of the session, roles were
1A session included also other tasks that were later explained to participants. The complete description
is in Arrunada and Casari (2010). Here we analyze the same data studied in the cited paper.
2assigned randomly and the decisions of persons 1 and 3 had no impact on the outcome.
Participants were instructed to choose among the available options as if they knew they
were the dictator (Person 2). Choices were written on a personal card. The experimenter
collected the cards, shued them, randomly formed groups, and randomly assigned roles.
For each group, the card of the subject in role 2 (Person 2) was used to dene the earnings
in the group. The choices written on the cards of persons 1 and 3 were ignored. Half of the
groups were paid according to choices made in the rst table (Panel 1: A, B, C) and the
other half to choices made in the second table (Panel 2: D, E, F).2 Subjects learned the
results at the end of the session. Predictions for common models of other-regarding agents
- such as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) - are in Table 1.
After this task we ran a one-shot guessing game in which all subjects had to write a
real number between 0 and 100 on their personal decision cards. They were informed that
groups of three would be randomly formed, and then a target number for each group would
be computed by taking two thirds (p = 2=3) of the group average. Within each group, the
subject closest to her target number received 6 points, which were evenly split in case of a
tie.
After everybody made a choice, the experimenter collected all decision cards and wrote
the results for both tasks on the cards, and returned to the subjects at the end of the session.
The prize was split equally and individual earnings were 2 points. A point was worth USD
0.45. Earnings were paid privately at the end of a session. Regarding predictions, the best
choices for a rational, self-regarded agent in the earlier task are C and F. In the guessing
game, the Nash equilibrium is to choose the number 0.
2 Results
We present raw data about choices in the dictator game and in the guessing game sepa-
rately. In Table 1 one can see that 48% of subjects show a strong preference for equality
(A in Panel 1) and 51% show a strong preference for eciency (D in Panel 2).
The frequency of choices in the guessing game is instead in Figure 1. Mean and median
values are in line with those reported in Nagel (1995) for the one-shot guessing game
with p=2/3. A way to analyze the data of the guessing games is through the well-known
Iterated Best Reply model (IBR from now on) (Nagel, 1995; Camerer et al., 2004). In this
2Participants decided under a `veil of ignorance' because their choice had 1/3 probability of being
enacted, thus inherently dierent from Rawls, where the pivotal person taking the allocation decision may
end up as person 1, 2, or 3. Here the pivotal person is always person 2.
3model each subject has a uniform prior over other players' choices and applies one level of
reasoning deeper than what she believes that the other players will do. The IBR model
can be specied under degenerate or non-degenerate beliefs about the other players. Under
degenerate belief everyone assumes that all the other players are at the same specic level
of reasoning. Under non-degenerate beliefs "...a subject gives positive probabilities to the
other players being at more than on level of reasoning" (Ho et al., 1998). In Figure 1,
next to the horizontal axis, we report the reference values to classify choices according IBR
model and Iterated Dominance (ID) model as well. In ID model (Ochs, 1995), rational
agents will reach the Nash equilibrium outcome after a series of steps: values larger than
100p - dominated strategies - are initially eliminated (with p being 2/3), then values larger
than 100p2, and so on and so forth up to the Nash equilibrium in which everyone chooses
0. In our analysis, we focus on the IBR model, largely recognized as more apt to capture
and explain behavior in the guessing game (Nagel, 1995)3.
For simplicity, we consider an IBR model with degenerate beliefs: In this case Step 0
players choose randomly, Step 1 players choose the best reply to 50, which is the mean
value considering a uniform distribution of possible values with support [0;100]. Step 2
players believe that all other players apply Step 1 reasoning, hence Step 2 players best
reply to a value of 50p2, Step 3 best reply to 50p3, and so on and so forth4.
We look at a possible relationship between bounded rationality and concerns for equality
and eciency. To this end, we classify subjects according to the steps of reasonings in the
IBR model and then graph the share of subjects who chose a specic earnings allocation
by step of reasoning, in Figure 2.
Consider for a moment the left panel, which reports choices concerning equality. Line
A illustrates the fraction of subjects who preferred strict equality(A), among those that
the IBR model classies as Step 0, Step 1, etc. Similarly, line C illustrates the fraction
of subjects who preferred to maximize personal earnings. One can see that the shares of
choices for the self-regarding option do not increase for higher steps of reasoning, when we
compare it with the choices for equality. When dividing subjects into steps of reasoning,
a similar share of subjects in each step chose the self-regarding option over the equality
option.
On the contrary, in the right panel, we report a comparison of eciency (D), versus
self-regard (F). The right panel of Figure 2 suggests that the fraction of subjects that have
a higher concern for eciency increases for higher steps of reasoning.
3See Coricelli and Nagel (2009) for references.
4In the case of non-degenerate beliefs, the initial reference point is a realization from a uniform distri-
bution function with mean value 50.
4Result 1: The share of subjects who prefer equality over self-regard is similar across
steps of reasoning. The share of subjects who prefer eciency over self-regard is larger for
higher steps of reasoning.
Table 3 reports the marginal eects of a series of probit regressions on individual choices
for A, C, D, and F, respectively. In the rst regression, the dependent variable takes value
1 when the subject chose A in the dictator game of Table 1, Panel 1, and 0 otherwise.
The regressors are a list of dummy variables that code the number of steps of reasoning
according to the IBR model.
The regressions show that there is no signicant relationship between the distributional
choices with respect to equality concerns and the number of steps of reasoning. On the
contrary, there is a signicant relationship between the distributional choices with respect
to eciency and the number of steps of reasoning. In particular, those subjects who
performed more than two steps of reasoning are less likely to have made the self-regarding
choice F5
Going beyond the composition of the population characterizing each step of reasoning,
we investigate the distribution of the values that these same subjects expressed across the
dimension of preferences on income distribution. In Table 2 we compared the average
numerical guesses of those who cared most for equality (A) with the average guess of those
who chose the self-regarding option (C), in each step of reasoning. A similar statistic was
computed for those who chose D versus F. The mean guess related to the choice of A is
larger than the value for the choice of C. Moreover, in all steps, the mean guess related
to the choice of D is larger than the value for the choice of F. A series of Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests6 compared the distributions of the guesses
of subjects who chose A vs C and D vs F, classied according to the IBR model.
Both tests accept the hypothesis that the distribution of the values of A are signicantly
larger than C for higher steps of reasoning - for Step 2 and Higher Steps; the same holds
for D versus F for Higher Steps (Table 2) .
Result 2: When performing step by step comparisons, the mean guess of subjects who
prefer strict equality is signicantly larger than the mean guess of those who favors personal
5In addition we performed similar regressions including among the regressors also the value of the
guess, to inspect the relation between the value of guess and self-regarding choice. Results are reported in
the Appendix. Regressions where the value of the guessing game is the only regression report no signicant
correlation. When both the dummies and the value of the guessing game are introduced, results are show
how self-regarding subjects who have a high level of rationality exhibit much lower values of the guessing
game - a value much closer to the Nash equilibrium - with respect to those preferring equality or eciency.
6The p-values of the KS test involve a bootstrap procedure with 10000 repetitions.
5gains. Moreover, the mean guess of subjects who prefers maximum eciency is larger than
the mean guess of those who favors personal gains.
This result appears in Figure 3. The left panel depicts the mean guess of the participants
who chose A normalized by the median calculated for the relative step of reasoning (solid
line), compared to the mean value of subjects who chose C again normalized by the median
calculated for the relative step of reasoning (dotted line). The normalization for the median
facilitates visual comparability among observations across dierent steps of reasoning. The
right panel of Figure 3, illustrates the choices for D versus F.
3 Conclusions
We have a proxy for strategic rationality and proxies for other-regarding preferences that
are independent one from another and `clean'. They are independent because they come
from two separate games. They are clean because, on the one hand, the depth of strategic
reasoning emerges from behavior in the guessing game, where the other-regarding orienta-
tion plays no role (Ho et al., 1998); on the other hand, three-players dictator games allow
to classify subjects into types according to their concern for equality and eciency and the
game has no room for strategic motivations.
We can summarize the results into ve points. First, are more rational subjects more
frequently of the self-regarding type? The answer is no. The overall evidence shows that
subjects engaging in higher steps of reasoning on average are as many exhibiting concerns
for equality and eciency as the other subjects. Second, the answer is linked also to how
we identify self-regard in practice, whether we contrast it with a concern for eciency or,
instead, for equality. We report that the relation between other-regarding preferences and
strategic rationality is stronger with respect to concerns for eciency than to concerns for
equality. Third, subjects engaging in higher steps of reasoning exhibit on average more
concerns for eciency than other subjects. Fourth, subjects engaging in higher steps of
reasoning exhibit similar concerns for equality than other subjects. Fifth, we can also
reverse the question into the following: are more rational subjects more self-regarding?
The answer is yes. When performing a comparison within the same step of reasoning,
self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.
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74 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Three person dictator games.
Panel 1 - Equality Panel 2 - Eciency
A B C D E F
Person 1 8 11 12 20.5 12 7.5
Person 2 (dictator) 8 8.5 9 6.5 7 7.5
Person 3 8 4.5 3 5 5 5
Total 24 24 24 32 24 20
Average earning of 1, 3 8 7.75 7.5 12.75 8.5 6.25
Experimental Choices N=195 N=195
N of subjects 94 27 74 100 32 63
Percentage 48.2 13.8 37.9 51.3 16.4 32.3
Mean guess 42.7 39.0 39.7 39.6 44.6 41.6
Median guess 38.0 36.0 37.5 35.5 41.6 42.0
Predictions
Self-regarding C F
Eciency - - - D
Bolton and Ockenfels A F
Fehr and Schmidt A F
Maximin A - - -
8Table 2: Mean Guesses within steps of reasoning and distributional choices.
Equality Mean guess Equality vs Self-regard
Equality Self-regard A > C
Steps guess ranges A B C MW KS
Step 0 (50;100) 71.24 76.60 65.73 0.19 0.15
Step 1 (33:33;50] 41.73 44.03 41.35 0.34 0.23
Step 2 (22:22;33:33] 29.72 28.61 27.95 0.03** 0.08*
Higher Steps (0;22:22] 15.03 14.32 8.64 0.09* 0.02**
Eciency Mean guess Eciency vs Self-regard
Eciency Self-regard D > F
Steps guess ranges D E F MW KS
Step 0 (50;100) 72.08 71.21 65.64 0.11 0.15
Step 1 (33:33;50] 42.07 41.48 41.78 0.35 0.52
Step 2 (22:22;33:33] 29.18 29.36 27.84 0.15 0.30
Higher Steps (0;22:22] 13.81 15.67 8.25 0.06* 0.06*
The mean value of the guessing game subdivided per steps of reasoning and choices in the distribution
games. MW test and KS performed on guesses separately for levels of reasoning. Signicance: *** 99%,
** 95%, * 90%.
9Table 3: Steps of reasoning and concern for eciency and equality.
Dependent Variable
A (equality) C (self-regard) D(eciency) F(self-regard)
Step 0 0.13 -0.08 0.01 -0.08
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Step 2 0.04 -0.01 0.12 -0.15
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Higher Steps 0.02 -0.11 0.13 -0.16**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Signicance: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%. Probit model with dependent variables the choices A(C) and D(F)
and as regressors dummy variables for the Steps of reasoning of the IBR model. Marginal eects evaluated
at the mean are reported with relative standard errors in parenthesis.
10Figure 1: Distribution of choices in the guessing game























































Step 1 for IBR model includes the value 50.
11Figure 2: Fraction of subjects' choices
Equality vs Self−regard
































































































Figure 2 Fraction of subjects' choices choosing A(C) or D(F) on the total number of subjects in the same
step. n reports number of subjects per step and total percentage of subjects in the step in the total
sample(195).
Figure 3: Mean guess divided by median guess
Equality vs Self−regard


























































n=48 (24.6%) n=75 (38.5%) n=37 (19%) n=35 (17.9%)
Efficiency vs Self−regard


























































Figure 3 the mean guess of subjects choosing A(C) (or D(F)) divided by the median guess in the same
step.
125 Appendix - Not for publication
Table 4: Guess and concerns for eciency and equality.
Dependent Variable
A (equality) C (self-regard) D (eciency) F (self-regard)
guess 0.001 -0.01 -0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Signicance: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%. Probit model with dependent variables the choices A(C) and
D(F)and independent variables, the value of the guess of each subject, "guess". Standard errors in paren-
thesis.
Table 5: Steps of reasoning and concerns for eciency and equality.
Dependent Variable
A (equality) C (self-regard) D (eciency) F (self-regard)
guess 0.007 -0.01*** 0.007 -0.01**
(0.004) (0.004 (0.004) (0.004)
Step 0 -0.14 0.34** -0.24 0.21
(0.15 (0.15) (0.16) (0.14)
Step 2 0.11 -0.17 0.20* -0.29***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Higher Steps 0.19 -0.48*** 0.32** -0.48***
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Signicance: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%. Probit model with dependent variables the choices A(C) and
D(F)and independent variables, the value of the guess of each subject, "guess", and dummy variables
corresponding to the Steps of reasoning in the IBR model. Standard errors in parenthesis.
13